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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world where almost everything is recorded.  With tiny, powerful 
cameras at our fingertips—on our phones, laptops, and tablets—we can digitally 
capture almost every aspect of our lives if we choose to.  Further, we can transmit 
these recordings virtually instantaneously for almost anyone to see, and the range of 
uses for these videos is practically limitless.  Applications like Snapchat, Instagram, 
Twitter’s Periscope, and Facebook are used for everything from capturing and 
exposing criminal activity or police misconduct, to disseminating makeup tricks and 
techniques, to performing lip-syncs in our cars.1  Because of the ubiquitous usage of 
these powerful little cameras, some pundits have argued not only that society has less 
and less of an expectation of privacy in public places, but that people don’t mind the 
potential for constant video surveillance that this represents.2  Others contest this idea 
and argue that the fact that we have accepted these technologies does not mean we 
have accepted the “constant, democratized monitoring” that they provide.3 
Even though live-streaming technologies have existed since the 1990s, they have 
recently been declared “the next big thing in social media.”4  Modern live-streaming 
capabilities have evolved parallel to improvements in cellular phone devices:  as cell 
phones have become more powerful and better able to transmit data, live-streaming 
technology has become more accessible to average users, both individuals and 
companies.5 
There are various legal rights implicated in any given live stream, from copyright 
and trademark, to right of publicity, to speech and information-gathering rights 
protected by the First Amendment, to privacy rights.  As outlets such as Facebook 
Live and Snapchat become more available and widely used, the implications of 
broadcasting live content over the Internet become more complicated.  This Note 
looks to examine some of these implications in depth, focusing on one of the newest 
and most popular live-streaming mediums:  Facebook Live. 
Facebook launched Facebook Live exclusively for verified celebrities on August 
5, 2015, but since that time, it has expanded the program’s availability to anyone 
with a Facebook account.  Over the past year, the popularity of Facebook Live has 
grown significantly. 6   Today, everyone from the average Facebook user to 
established broadcasters like ABC (who used Facebook Live to live stream the 2016 
Presidential Debates) is using the platform.7  This rise from obscurity, along with the 
 
 1.  Joe E. Lazauskus, The Untold Story of Facebook Live, THE FAST COMPANY (Sept. 29, 2016, 
12:50 PM), https://perma.cc/4BNE-39CT. 
 2. Daxton Stewart & Jeremy Littau, Up, Periscope: Mobile Streaming Video Technologies, 
Privacy in Public, and the Right to Record, JOURNALISM AND MASS COMM. Q. 1, 2-3 (2016), available at 
https://perma.cc/NV74-H9JM. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Scott Kleinberg, Live Streaming: The Next Big Thing in Social Media, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 
1, 2015), http://perma.cc/H7LY-W2Z3. 
 5. Stewart & Littau, supra note 2, at 1 (“While live streaming video apps are not new, widespread 
growth in the use of this technology had been limited by poor quality and lack of social connectivity”). 
 6. Lazauskus, supra note 1. 
 7. Id. 
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proliferation of similar applications like Instagram Live, Snapchat, and Periscope, 
has raised a crop of legal issues, the ramifications of which have not yet fully come 
to light. 
Some of these issues include:  What are the legal implications of recording and 
broadcasting content without other people’s permission via Facebook Live and 
similar mediums?  Do the people captured in these recordings have any rights to 
control or prevent the recording and broadcast?  What recourse do the people in the 
videos have if the videographers are liable for violations of privacy law?  What 
happens if they are not?  What would be the potential for exposure to civil or criminal 
liability for the streamers themselves?  Lastly, what about the Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs):  should they be liable for the actions of users?  Can they be held 
responsible under current law? 
This Note argues that live-streaming technology has implicated several important 
legal rights held by various parties, from the freedom of expression rights of the 
videographers/streamers themselves, to privacy rights of inadvertent participants in 
a third party’s live stream.  Part I briefly discusses the types of streaming currently 
available, focusing on an explanation of live-streaming and the transition from 
archived content applications to live-streaming applications, and then moves on to 
examining the trajectory of the laws governing live-streaming technology.  
Additionally, Part I discusses parts of the body of both state and federal privacy laws 
which could apply to live-streaming.  Part II of this Note applies the framework 
established in Part I to Facebook Live, comparing the live-streaming service to more 
traditional broadcasting, and discussing the rights and liabilities of live-streamers, 
those who may inadvertently find themselves included in a live stream, and select 
third parties.  Part III discusses past solutions to privacy issues raised by media 
activities, and Part IV examines why the advent of social media live-streaming 
presents novel questions.  Part V concludes this Note by discussing potential policy 
implications and asking the question:  where do we go from here? 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. TRAJECTORY OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
The story of social media has been one of quick evolution.  New “apps” are here 
one day and gone the next, and new methods of sharing information online have 
cropped up regularly for over a decade, giving users a plethora of options from which 
to choose.8 
Adoption of live-streaming is a relatively recent social media trend.  Webcasting 
options such as Google’s Hangout Live and Ustream developed to allow users to 
broadcast from the built-in web cameras in their computers to multiple other users in 
real time.9  While these options saw some initial success, they did not gain the same 
traction as the newer live-streaming applications, because they were handicapped by 
 
 8. Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005-2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 8, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/32JZ-D3QL.  
 9. Stewart & Littau, supra note 2, at 5-6. 
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poor video quality and slow Internet and data speeds.10   It was not until these 
problems were resolved that live-streaming could take its current form, transitioning 
to a model based on mobile apps and devices.11 
Apps like Meerkat and Periscope first surfaced in 2015, representing the start of 
live-streaming as a popular option of personal broadcasting.12  Prior to these two 
options, while there were many popular social media platforms (like YouTube, 
Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and Snapchat) that allowed users to post videos, these 
videos were not live broadcasts transmitted simultaneously to users, but rather pre-
recorded clips.13 
Meerkat is a mobile app that allows users to broadcast live videos with their 
smartphones.14  Twitter’s version of this function is Periscope, which also provides 
for the archiving and playback of content for twenty-four hours.15  Both apps provide 
for user communication through comments and messages that the broadcaster can 
read and respond to.16  The apps launched in rapid succession in March of 2015, but 
after a brief period of success for Meerkat, Periscope quickly dominated, becoming 
one of the most popular iPhone apps while Meerkat’s growth stagnated and its 
popularity began to fall. 17   By September 2016, the Meerkat application was 
removed from the App Store.18 
More recently, a newer approach to live-streaming has been developed.  Rather 
than requiring a separate application, live-streaming functionality has been integrated 
into popular apps that are already widely used, like Facebook and Instagram.19 
Facebook remains the most-used social media platform, with over two billion 
users, but one of its biggest challenges has been differentiating itself from newer 
forms of social media and avoiding the pitfall of obsolescence.20  As part of its 
response to that challenge, Facebook Live was first launched on a limited basis in 
2015, after the debut of Meerkat and Periscope.21  The feature was rolled out slowly 
and took time to reach a large user base, but it is swiftly becoming a widely-used 
 
 10. Id. at 1, 6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 1. 
 13. Kleinberg, supra note 4.  Live-streaming capabilities are not new, however mobile technology 
has advanced significantly, allowing live-streaming to become more popular. 
 14. John Patrick Pullen, You Asked: What is the Meerkat App?, TIME, (Mar. 14, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/YGC9-AR5X. 
 15. See PERISCOPE, https://perma.cc/6CZY-CPB2 (last visited Oct. 21, 2017). 
 16. Stewart & Littau, supra note 2, at 7. 
 17. Glenn Peoples, The Meerkat Minefield: Legal Issues With Live-Streaming Apps, BILLBOARD 
(Mar. 30, 2015), https://perma.cc/636L-FLPU.   
 18. Nick Statt, Live-Streaming Pioneer Meerkat Has Been Pulled from the App Store, THE VERGE 
(Sep. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/APJ4-SAZA. 
 19. Michelle Fitzsimmons, Instagram Live Video is Here:  One Part Facebook Live, One Part 
Snapchat, TECH RADAR (Dec. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/2LZZ-SCQ8. 
 20. Shannon Greenwood et al., Social Media Update 2016, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 11, 
2016), https://perma.cc/FN7N-EG3C.; Josh Constine, Facebook Now Has 2 Billion Monthly Users…and 
Responsibility, TECHCRUNCH (Jun. 27, 2017), https://perma.cc/L8D9-JNNN. 
 21. Lazauskus, supra note 1. 
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feature of Facebook.22  In the months following Facebook Live’s launch, the creators 
at Facebook compiled data around the use of the platform which depicted a story of 
success beyond what the creators anticipated.23  In response, Facebook invested 
heavily in researching the effects of the launch and developing content for viewers, 
spending as much as $50 million to induce influential users to create video and 
content for the platform.24 
The future of both Facebook and live video broadcasting is still unclear, and there 
are many who doubt that live video will provide the sustained impetus Facebook 
needs, or that it will sustain the traction it has gained.  However, Facebook Live has 
been one of the biggest launches for Facebook in terms of convincing users to heavily 
engage with the platform and post original content.  The launch of Facebook Live 
moved the needle on engagement more than all of Facebook’s earlier product 
launches of the year combined.25  Considering the fickle nature of social media users 
and the rapid pace of advancements in streaming technology, it is hard to determine 
at this point just how successful this feature will be, but the data that Facebook has 
compiled following the roll-out of Facebook Live suggests that the platform has 
created a way for users to share timely, interactive, and valuable content, and that 
large numbers of people, on average, are watching that content.26 
B. LIVE-STREAMING TO REPLACE LIVE TV?   
To illustrate how live-streaming has been utilized as a substitute for live 
television, I will briefly discuss a notable example of its use.  The popular website 
BuzzFeed was an early adopter of Facebook Live.  In one significant use of the 
medium, BuzzFeed broadcast a live video of rubber bands being used to make a 
watermelon explode; that broadcast reached more than 800 thousand simultaneous 
viewers.27  When you consider that CNN averages 723 thousand prime-time TV 
viewers, the implications of this figure are clear:  users are watching live streams in 
significant numbers. 
On September 26, 2016, the first Presidential Debate of the 2016 Election was 
held.  While traditional television stations such as CNN, ABC, and NBC still drew 
in tens of millions of viewers (making it the most-watched such debate ever), a large 
contingent of the estimated eighty-four million total viewers chose to watch via live 
stream. 28   The debates from the 2016 Presidential Election were broadcast via 
Facebook Live to over twenty-eight million people.29  There were fifty-five million 
 
 22. Id.  During initial testing, Facebook Live was only made available to celebrities and other users 
with verified Facebook accounts, such as The Rock, and Ricky Gervais.   
 23. Lazauskus, supra note 1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.; Steven Perlberg, Presidential Debate Sets Viewership Record, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 
2016), https://perma.cc/R9ZD-EGCD. 
 29. Id. 
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viewers of debate-related videos on Facebook Live during the first debate.30  Another 
2.5 million simultaneous viewers watched live streams on YouTube, and millions 
more used other streaming services.31  If Facebook Live sustains its momentum, it 
has the potential to supplant or, at the very least, compete with live TV, especially 
with regard to the consumption of news.32 
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE BEFORE FACEBOOK LIVE 
A. DECENCY 
While Meerkat and Periscope were lauded for the technological and social 
advancement that they represented, numerous legal issues were implicated by these 
early services.  As Stewart and Littau wrote, “live-streaming technologies . . . are the 
most recent encroachment on the waning notion that people may have some right to 
privacy in public places.”33 
Since live-streaming on the Internet is a technological step forward from 
broadcast television, it is necessary to briefly discuss the law surrounding traditional 
broadcast TV.  The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) received the power 
to restrict and respond to complaints of indecent material on broadcast TV with the 
passing of the 1934 Communications Act.  This Act charged the FCC with ensuring 
that broadcasting activities serve the “public convenience, interest, or necessity.”34  
Traditional broadcast TV is overseen by the FCC which, in conjunction with 18 
U.S. §1464, provides “decency” standards for the content broadcast on television.35  
In the case of “live” broadcasts, there are often short delays between the filming and 
the delivery of content; these delays allow broadcasters to edit their videos for 
excessively violent, indecent, and obscene content which might violate the decency 
standards of the FCC.  These same delays can be used to “blur” the faces or 
identifying characteristics of individuals captured in a feed who have not consented 
to be broadcast.  Additionally, television channels can transmit pre-recorded and 
edited footage to their viewers.  Internet streaming services do not have these 
requirements or capabilities, leaving them more vulnerable to privacy violations.36 
In Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, “indecent” language was defined as language that 
“describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs. . . .”37  
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Brian Selter, Debate Breaks Record as Most-Watched in U.S. History, CNN (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/ZRC2-7L9S.  
 32. Lazauskus, supra note 1 (“Thus the growth of online video streaming in the past five years has 
slowly allowed citizen players to compete alongside broadcast corporations”). 
 33. Stewart, supra note 2, at 1. 
 34. 47 U.S.C. § 303. 
 35. 18 U.S.C. §1464. 
 36. Angela Moon & Dustin Volz, Facebook Live Streaming of Shooting Spotlights Ethical, Legal 
Policies, REUTERS, (July 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/GW84-XNN3. 
 37. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, 438 U.S. 726 
(1978). 
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To warrant action by the FCC, the broadcast must contain more than an isolated use 
of an offensive word.38 
Broadcast television, like live-streaming, is afforded protection under the First 
Amendment, meaning the FCC’s regulation or censorship of particular programs and 
stations is subject to the limitations of that Amendment.  Federal law provides the 
FCC with the ability to respond to complaints about indecent or obscene content39 
by giving warnings, fining stations, or even revoking a station’s license, and its 
decisions are legally binding;40 however, any response to a complaint must be careful 
to balance the FCC’s mandate with the broadcaster’s freedom of speech under the 
First Amendment, as well as federal anti-censorship law.41 
The Communications Decency Act also regulates computer service providers.  In 
Section 230, the Act says in part:  “No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”42  This means that Internet companies that 
host content created and posted by third parties (like Facebook) are protected from 
the legal consequences of posting violent and obscene content, while traditional TV 
broadcasters are not.43  Section 230 was a pivotal piece of legislation with regard to 
protecting freedom of speech on the internet and allowing host services like 
Facebook to thrive on user-generated content. 44   This potentially gives live-
streaming services an advantage over their traditional broadcast predecessors.  For 
example, because of statutory limitations placed on liability, ISPs have no legal 
obligation to affirmatively monitor the posting of content on their services, and thus 
do not need to expend costs to police content.45 
B. SELF-REGULATION AND CENSORSHIP OF LIVE-STREAMING 
Traditional television broadcasting has a number of special characteristics that 
differentiate it from other forms of traditional media and protect broadcasters.46  
Traditional broadcasting includes “communication to the public, simultaneous 
reception by the public, passive audience and fixation of time and content.”47  Live-
streaming has similar features to traditional live broadcasting in that the recording 
and broadcasting of content happen at virtually the same time, and thus the legal 
 
 38. In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699 (F.C.C. 1987). 
 39. Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity – FAQ, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://perma.cc/5W3H-
89K8 (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).   
 40. See Thomas L. Tedford, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 385 (1985). 
 41. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 326. 
 42. 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 43. See Moon & Volz, supra note 36. 
 44. See CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 
FOUNDATION, https://perma.cc/5W43-VR9X. 
 45. 17 U.S.C. §512. 
 46. As discussed by M. Sakthivel an assistant professor at the University School of Law & Legal 
Studies at GGS Indraprastha University who authored a comparative study of “peer-2-peer” streaming 
technology.  See M. Sakthivel, Webcasters’ Protection Under Copyright - A Comparative Study, 27 
COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 479, 484 (2011). 
 47. Id. 
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protections afforded to live TV broadcasting are more applicable for live-streaming 
than for on-demand streaming. 48   There are two key differences between live-
streaming apps and traditional broadcast television.  First, anyone, anywhere can 
become a broadcaster, as long as they have a smartphone with the right technological 
capabilities.  These apps are widely accessible, and anyone with access to them has 
the ability to broadcast content, eliminating many of the barriers for entry to live-
broadcasting that have previously existed.  Second, because people access these 
feeds with their phones and computers, the dissemination of these feeds is now 
decentralized.49 
Alongside the acknowledgment of the broadcast capabilities of live-streaming 
apps, questions have arisen about the use of these services to display graphic and 
disturbing images, and even to promote and facilitate terrorism.50  A notable example 
of this friction arose in the aftermath of the Philando Castile shooting on July 6, 2016, 
which was broadcast via Facebook Live.  Philando Castile was a young black man 
who was shot by a police officer after being pulled over for an alleged broken 
taillight. 51   His fiancée, Diamond Reynolds, used Facebook Live to stream the 
immediate aftermath of the shooting to her Facebook followers.52  The video quickly 
went viral, with more than four million views by the next day.53  While the use of 
cell phones by citizens to capture police violence and misconduct is not new, the 
simultaneity of the shooting and the video introduces a layer of complexity.  In 
particular, the “decency” standards which apply to broadcast television do not apply 
to Internet streaming, and the simultaneity of the broadcast eliminates any 
opportunity to check for “indecent” content before the act of broadcast.54 
Reynolds’ video presented a test for Facebook’s new feature and an unusually 
public instance of Facebook working out some of the issues in their Live-streaming 
policies.  Initially, Facebook removed Reynolds’ video; it then reposted the video 
with a graphic content warning label.55  This removal garnered extensive criticism, 
and Facebook released a statement apologizing for the brief inaccessibility of the 
video, which it blamed on a technical glitch.56  The video represents the type of 
sensitive, newsworthy, yet graphic content that makes the immediacy of Facebook 
Live and other live-streaming apps controversial under certain circumstances.57 
The controversy around Castile’s death was only one of Facebook’s many 
struggles with balancing the value of immediate live broadcasting and the desire to 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Stewart & Littau, supra note 2. 
 50. See Moon & Volz, supra note 36. 
 51. Elliot C. McLaughlin, Woman Streams Aftermath of Fatal Officer-involved Shooting, CNN 
(July 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/6GK9-ZX3P. 
 52. Moon & Volz, supra note 36.   
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. There is often a slight delay between recording and broadcasting in live TV to account 
for these decency standards, that does not occur with Internet streaming. 
 55. Kathleen Chaykowsky, Philando Castile’s Death on Facebook Live Highlights Problems for 
Social Media Apps, FORBES (July 7, 2016 4:52 PM), https://perma.cc/RXX3-WM9S. 
 56. Id.; Moon & Volz, supra note 36. 
 57. See Chaykowsky, supra note 55. 
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censor sensitive and violent content.  In June, a terrorism suspect in France used 
Facebook Live to make threats of violence.  Facebook shut down the suspect’s 
account and removed the video.58  That same month, following a double homicide in 
France, the killer used Facebook Live to incite further violence.  A young man, 
Antonio Perkins, was using Facebook Live when shots rang out and he fell to the 
ground, apparently having been shot and killed.59 
Other platforms like Periscope have suffered from some of the same problems as 
Facebook Live:  in April of 2016 a young woman used Periscope to film her friend’s 
rape, and another used it to film her own suicide.60  Rabbi Abraham Cooper of the 
Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Digital Terrorism and Hate project worries about the 
ability of terrorists to use Facebook Live as a tool to promote terrorist agendas:  “The 
availability of a live broadcast, unencumbered, becomes a horrendous tool in the 
hands of a terrorist.”61   In response to these mounting problems, Facebook has 
expanded its team dedicated to reviewing live videos.62 
The next section will examine some of the methods of addressing privacy 
violations that have been deployed in the past against traditional media sources. 
III. PAST SOLUTIONS AND TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
There are two types of streaming methods in use today:  Live-streaming, which 
means that video is simultaneously recorded and broadcast, and on-demand 
streaming, which occurs when video is captured, stored, and re-transmitted later.  
Live-streaming presents a novel challenge to the limits of privacy law for two 
significant reasons:  first, anyone with access to a smartphone and the internet can be 
a live streamer; second, the acts of recording and transmitting occur simultaneously, 
meaning that without a preemptive regulatory framework, any recourse to privacy 
violations must happen after the fact.63  Now, each user can function as their own 
broadcasting station, transmitting live events, entertainment, news, sporting events, 
and more with their smartphone. 
Because live-streaming in its current form is a new phenomenon, the courts have 
yet to deal with a prominent live-streaming case that has yielded any guiding 
principles.  However, we’ve seen changes in technology affect our perceptions and 
treatment of privacy in the past, and by looking to some of these examples, it is 
possible to predict how live-streaming may, and should, be treated in the future. 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Moon & Volz, supra note 36. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at. 10. 
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A. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The right of publicity is the right to protect one’s name and likeness from being 
used for a third party’s commercial gain.64  Generally, the ordinary citizen does not 
have a name or likeness that is attractive for the prospect of monetization.  Therefore, 
the right of publicity tends to be enforced on behalf of commercial entities, 
celebrities, and public figures more often than ordinary citizens.65  This right has 
been enforced against traditional media sources as a method of protecting the privacy 
of individuals; it creates a cause of action when an individual loses the ability to 
control the use of their name or likeness in commerce. 
Right of publicity questions are a state law matter, and there tends to be significant 
divergence among the states.66  For example, in New York, this right is codified in 
§50 of the Civil Rights Law.67  To support a claim under § 50, the statute requires 
that the plaintiff demonstrate that (1) a person, firm or corporation used (2) for 
advertising or trade purposes (3) the name, portrait, or picture of any living person 
(4) without consent.68  If these elements are satisfied, the defendant will be held 
guilty of a misdemeanor.69 
If a third party is using the rightholder’s likeness to generate revenue (for example, 
using a celebrity’s image to endorse a product in a commercial), the key legal 
question is whether the videographer (the person who takes the video) is merely an 
intermediary, as opposed to an independent commercial actor; is the videographer 
the person that must benefit in order for the plaintiff to have recourse?  Will a 
corporation that hires a videographer be swept up in claims of liability for the 
videographer’s actions? 
B. RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
This section sketches the evolution of state privacy laws as they have been applied 
to traditional media.  The right to privacy is more applicable to lay people than the 
right to publicity, which, as discussed above, tends to be enforced on behalf of public 
figures more often than ordinary citizens.  Thus, the right to privacy may be available 
to help those who find themselves live streamed on the Internet inadvertently.  
Though the right to privacy is alluded to in the Bill of Rights, the right is enforced 
through state law, which can become complicated when content is broadcast online 
and received by individuals in multiple states.70 
 
 64. See Tara E. Langvardt, Reinforcing the Commercial-Noncommercial Distinction: A 
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Privacy law has typically been bifurcated between laws governing the gathering 
of information and those governing its dissemination.  Live-streaming platforms like 
Facebook Live eliminate this distinction by allowing users to collect and broadcast 
information simultaneously.  This creates a question for courts at the intersection of 
two rights:  the right to record and the right to privacy.71 
The first description of the right to privacy can be found in Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis’ Harvard Law Review article “The Right to Privacy.”72  This article 
is considered one of the most influential law review articles of all time.73  Warren 
and Brandeis argued in their article that a right to privacy was necessary because the 
law as it stood at the time was inadequate to address the concerns that invasions of 
privacy create.74  For example, at the time of the article’s publication, defamation 
law was not an adequate remedy to address some invasions of privacy because 
defamation requires a published false statement.75  Many jurisdictions also require 
intent for defamation claims.  The tort of invasion of privacy, on the other hand, has 
no intent requirement.76  Moreover, unlike in defamation cases, truth is an absolute 
defense where an individual’s privacy is invaded.  An invasion of privacy does not 
arise from the dissemination of false statements about a person, but from the 
exposure of one’s private life.  In other words, individuals have an interest in 
preventing the dissemination of certain information because it is true.77 
Four privacy torts were developed by William Prosser, partly in response to 
Warren and Brandeis’s article:  (1) intrusion on seclusion; (2) public disclosure of 
private facts; (3) false light publicity; and (4) appropriation of name or likeness.78  
Each state that recognizes the privacy torts codifies them in a different way, but there 
are similarities across the board.   
As stated in the Second Restatement of Torts, the first privacy tort is intrusion 
upon seclusion, which provides for liability on the part of “[o]ne who intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another” in a 
manner that would be objectionable or offensive to the reasonable person.79  Live 
streamers and broadcast television videographers alike are already subject to trespass 
laws, which provide for liability based on physical intrusions, but this tort provides 
protection for constructive intrusions as well.  The remedy for these intrusions is civil 
damages.80  The most common example of this tort is probably eavesdropping or 
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wiretapping but it can go further.81  In the Colorado case Doe v. High-Tech Inst., 
Inc., the court held that while this tort clearly applies to invasion of private physical 
spaces, it can also encompass intrusions into a person’s private concerns “based upon 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in that area.”82 
The second privacy tort in the Restatement is public disclosure of private facts, 
which requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant made a statement that 
is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” (a question of fact), and that the disclosed 
information is not of legitimate concern to the public (which can be a question either 
of fact or of law).83 
Plaintiffs have frequently attempted to apply this tort in the context of news 
broadcasts but it is difficult to succeed with such a claim because true, newsworthy 
material is not actionable.84  For example, in Wilkins v. Nat’l Broad. Co., the Court 
of Appeal for the Second District of California was presented with a case in which 
two employees of a television network posing as potential investors recorded and 
later broadcasted a conversation with sales representatives of a firm they were 
investigating.85  The court held that this was not a public disclosure of private facts.  
The court determined that the defendant’s investigation was newsworthy as a matter 
of law, barring recovery under this tort.86  Additionally, the judge noted that the 
plaintiffs did not conduct themselves as though the information they shared was 
private—they were in a public location, a restaurant, when the discussion took 
place.87  The court concluded that the intrusiveness of the broadcast did not outweigh 
the public interest in the information that was collected.88 
The third privacy tort is false light publicity.  A false light claim asks the court to 
provide damages for emotional distress and reputational harm stemming from the 
revelation of information that is used to construe the subject in a negative or 
misleading light.89  Similar to intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of 
private facts, states codify this tort in varying ways.  However, the elements of false 
light liability are:  (1) conduct that is highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (2) 
committed by an actor who had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the 
falsity of the publicized matter.90  The harm arises from the damage to an individual’s 
reputation as a result of the false statements being disclosed, and the ensuing 
emotional distress. 
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In the case of Machleder v. Diaz, the plaintiff sued a television network over an 
“ambush” interview. 91   He argued that the interview portrayed him in an 
“intemperate and evasive” false light and suggested that he was involved in the illegal 
dumping of chemical waste.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court’s grant of damages for the plaintiff, holding that the truth is a complete 
defense in a false light claim.92 
The fourth and last privacy tort in the Restatement is appropriation of name or 
likeness.  This tort involves the appropriation of the name or likeness of another for 
one’s own use and benefit.93  Many states require that the defendant’s use must be 
commercial in order for relief to be granted to plaintiffs.94  This tort comes in two 
variants:  emotional harm based on misappropriation, and pecuniary harm based on 
right of publicity, which is a property based right. 
In Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., a photographer took a photo of two men 
kissing at their wedding.  This photograph was used without permission in an 
advertisement that opposed the AARP.  The two men in the photograph argued that 
they were emotionally harmed by the fact that their image was used to support a 
political position they did not support.  The question before the court was whether 
the defendant’s use was commercial or noncommercial.  The court ultimately 
decided that the defendant’s use was not commercial. 95   Appropriation is not 
actionable when it is noncommercial and newsworthy because the First Amendment 
requires that a person’s name or likeness be used without liability if it is in connection 
to a matter of public interest or if the use is noncommercial in nature.96  As the 
Raymen case demonstrates, this tort represents an attempt by courts to balance 
freedom of the press with privacy.97 
Several other cases have developed the law related to privacy and the media, 
providing a backdrop for examining privacy interests in live-streaming cases.  Most 
of these cases involve traditional broadcast television or print media.  In Nader v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., Ralph Nader wrote an exposé about General Motors that 
criticized its allegedly unsafe safety and design practices.98  Nader alleged that, in 
response to his exposé, GM began a “campaign of intimidation” against him by 
conducting interviews with his acquaintances, surveilling him when he was in public 
places, “accost[ing]” him with girls making “illicit” proposals in an attempt to entrap 
him, making threatening and harassing telephone calls to him, and tapping his 
 
 91. Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (“Ambush interview is a derogatory 
descriptive term for a controversial investigative reporting technique in which a reporter and his news 
crew intercept an ‘unsuspecting newsworthy subject on the street and [bombard] him with incriminating 
accusations ostensibly framed as questions.’”). 
 92. Id. at 53. 
 93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b, illus. 1-6, cmt. c, illus. 7-8, cmt. d, illus. 9-
10 (1979). 
 95. Raymen v. United Senior Ass’n, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 96. Id. at 22. 
 97. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 2859 (1977); Lyrissa B. 
Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do about It, 73 
TUL. L. REV. 173, 184 (1998). 
 98. Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 767 (1970). 
JACKSON, I SPY: PRIVACY IMPLICATIONS OF LIVE STREAMING TECHNOLOGY, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 125 (2017) 
138 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:1 
phone. 99   He charged GM with intrusion on seclusion, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and tortious interference with business practices or economic 
advantage.  The court decided that there could be no invasion of privacy where the 
information sought was already open and available to the public or voluntarily 
revealed to others.100  Such a concept is relevant when considering the types of events 
that could become the substance of a live stream. 
In Shulman v. Grp. W Prod., Inc., a case decided nearly thirty years after Nader, 
the court was faced with the question of assessing newsworthiness—a question 
relevant to privacy claims because content deemed “newsworthy” can evade certain 
privacy restrictions.  Under California law, the question of what is newsworthy is 
largely a question of fact.  Shulman involves the words uttered by the victims of a 
car crash to a responding nurse, which were captured and broadcasted by television 
news cameras on the scene.  The plaintiff argued that the broadcast was an unlawful 
intrusion under the public disclosure of private facts tort.  The court concluded in this 
case that there must be a “logical nexus” between the complaining individual and the 
matter of legitimate public interest.  When a person is involuntarily involved in a 
newsworthy incident, not every aspect of the person’s conduct or life is thereby 
rendered newsworthy.  Nonetheless, the Court held that the disputed material was 
newsworthy as a matter of law.  The fact that the broadcast could have been edited 
to exclude the plaintiff’s words does not make them not newsworthy.101 
Privacy law has evolved continuously since 1890 when it was first discussed in 
Warren and Brandeis’ article.  It is not necessarily the case that our standards of 
privacy have changed with technological advances; rather, the emergence of new 
threats has led to a discordance between the public’s expectation of privacy and their 
experience in public places.102  While the current regime of privacy law is unlikely 
to impose liability upon the services that provide the platforms for live streamers, or 
users of these services, due to the protections built into the laws and developed 
through common law, the possibility of changes to these laws is not altogether far-
fetched. 
IV. WHY DOES LIVE-STREAMING PRESENT A NEW ISSUE? 
Live-streaming presents a pressing question for courts regarding how far they are 
willing to extend privacy torts: 
Further complicating the law surrounding use of [live-streaming technologies] is the 
right of citizens and journalists to record video in public places.  Under United States 
law, taking photographs in public places has increasingly received protection under the 
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First Amendment, though courts are split on the extent to which those protections 
should be extended to recording video[.]103 
In the first week of January 2017, four young adults used Facebook Live to stream 
themselves as they physically and verbally assaulted a young disabled man, 
ultimately leading to their arrest.104  This horrific attack is a harsh example of how 
Facebook Live and live-streaming are changing our reality:  live-streaming is 
becoming ever more pervasive to the point where people are filming just about 
everything—even their own criminal acts.  Social media users are broadcasting their 
“private” lives to an ever greater extent. 105   Arguments can be made that our 
expectations of privacy have shifted due to these changes because our lives could be 
seen by anyone in the world at virtually any time.106  Facebook Live and similar live-
streaming technologies represent the most recent foray into altering the public’s 
expectation of privacy or, at the very least, the most recent threat to the expectation 
of privacy that the public already holds. 
What makes Facebook Live particularly threatening is the sheer scale of its use.  
With over two billion Facebook users, the chance of encountering a Live user is high, 
and the law is unequipped to deal with some of the problems this pervasive recording 
presents.  In light of this, along with the fact that live-streaming technology is likely 
to become more (rather than less) widely used as time passes, legislators and scholars 
have begun to acknowledge that some sorts of adjustments are necessary with regard 
to privacy law.  This section will look to past applications of privacy law and discuss 
which, if any, could shed light on the implications of streaming technology for 
privacy law moving forward. 
As discussed above, there are multiple players that must be considered when 
conducting an analysis of the encroachment upon privacy caused by streaming and 
the status of privacy law.  For the purposes of this essay, I have boiled these players 
down into three main categories:  (1) the broadcaster, meaning the person using 
Facebook Live (or another streaming service) to capture and disseminate a live feed; 
(2) the service provider (the company that provides the platform through which users 
may stream and view streams); and (3) the inadvertent participant (the individual 
who finds themselves captured in a third party’s stream without their consent).  This 
section will aim to outline the major problems faced by each of these stakeholders 
when live-streaming occurs. 
A. DRONES AND THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW 
Before delving into how the current law affects the players, it is useful to briefly 
look at the development of drones, and their effect on privacy law, as a potential 
blueprint for the way live-streaming can push privacy law forward.  As the 
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affordability of these devices has increased, their pervasiveness has increased with 
it.  In response to this proliferation of drones, privacy law has advanced, if only 
incrementally.107 
Drones represent the capacity for increased unwanted aerial surveillance that is 
difficult to prevent.  If an unmanned aerial surveillance craft flies into one’s yard, 
there is little recourse for the person being surveilled short of knocking it out of the 
sky (which would create a host of problems of a different sort).108  While privacy 
laws vary by state, by 2014 at least thirteen states had passed civil or criminal laws 
to outlaw the use of drones for unwanted surveillance, and the Federal Aviation 
Administration released guidelines to regulate the use of drones in 2016.109  As will 
be the case with live-streaming, legislators were forced to consider how to balance 
the right to record with the right to privacy when devising methods to combat this 
new threat to privacy. 
The Federal Aviation Administration estimated that by the year 2030 there would 
be at least thirty thousand private drones in use. 110   And yet, the response by 
legislators has been tepid at best.  The FAA declined to include privacy matters in its 
2016 drone regulations, considering the job a task for state legislators, despite facing 
a federal lawsuit attempting to compel it to do so.111  However, at least thirty-eight 
states in 2016 have considered some form of legislation related to “UAS” or 
unmanned aircraft systems, the technical term for drones.112 
The question at this point is under which legal theory legislators can feasibly 
advance changes to privacy law given the status and progression of drone 
technology.  Potential options which stand out as especially viable include property 
law and tort law.  The Supreme Court, spurred by the advancement and proliferation 
of airplanes, decided in U.S. v. Causby that a homeowner “owns” (and can control) 
up to eighty-three feet of airspace above their property.113  Under a property doctrine, 
some legal theorists argue that by extending the height of property ownership, some 
of the privacy issues related to drones could be evaded. 114  Alternatively, using the 
privacy torts established through common law, a case for extending the breadth of 
the intrusion upon seclusion tort to encompass drones can be made.  Lyrissa Lidsky 
suggests that lawmakers “rejuvenate” tort law in light of technological advances: 
If the intrusion tort is to shield plaintiffs from prying, spying, and lying . . . courts must 
interpret the tort more expansively. Courts must acknowledge that citizens are entitled 
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to a modicum of privacy even in public places, and must modernize the intrusion tort 
to the threat posed by high-tech surveillance methods.115 
At this point, it is unclear which strategy, if any, will be most successful, but the 
fact that state legislators have considered updates and changes to their privacy laws 
in response to the increased accessibility of drones suggests that a response to live-
streaming is also feasible as the full impact of such technology becomes more 
apparent. 
One of the hurdles to get over before updating privacy laws on a large scale is 
possible is the First Amendment right to record.  The Supreme Court has not yet 
recognized or established a clear right to record in public places.116   However, 
various circuit courts have recognized such a right.117  This right, which has typically 
applied to filming government officials, is based on the premise that the First 
Amendment not only protects speech, but also certain methods of gathering and 
disseminating information and an individual’s right to record or photograph public 
officials performing their duties in public spaces.118  Expanded privacy laws could 
come up against the First Amendment in instances where users of live-streaming 
technology are prohibited from transmitting their streams, or service providers 
exercise prior restraint over their streams.  First Amendment protection for making 
and disseminating video recordings in public places is not entirely defined, especially 
in cases that do not involve public officials performing their duties.119 
Different Circuits and courts have come out in various ways as to how far 
protection for these video recordings extend.120  For example, while the Supreme 
Court has thus far not recognized any explicit right to make video recordings in 
public places, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has found First Amendment 
protection for the recording of police activity in public places, a ruling which 
theoretically could be extended to include making recordings of any public activity, 
though it currently applies only to public officials (with limitations, such as in 
“particularly dangerous situations,” or if the recording activity involves undercover 
police activity).121  In contrast, in a case before Texas’ Court of Criminal Appeals, 
the court essentially protected the right to record in public when it struck down 
Texas’ “Improper Photography” law as unconstitutionally “overbroad.”122 
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Stewart and Littau suggest that live-streaming technologies have the potential to 
be “privacy law catalysts.”123  But privacy law has not yet caught up to the incursion 
of these technologies.  Thus, there are important questions to consider when live-
streaming, such as where to strike the balance between the right to privacy and the 
rights protected by the First Amendment.  Each party affected by a live stream may 
have different questions depending on which role they play in the live-stream 
scenario, and there can be different answers to these questions.  By using Facebook 
Live, the successful live-streaming platform on the most used social media platform, 
and examining the players involved in a Facebook Live stream, some of these 
questions may be answered, and next steps revealed. 
B. FACEBOOK LIVE: A CASE STUDY 
As mentioned, this Note has honed in on Facebook Live because it is currently 
the most widely used example of live-streaming technology. 124   Instagram has 
introduced live-streaming capabilities as well, becoming the (relatively distant) 
second-most-used live-streaming platform.125   Earlier versions of live-streaming 
technology, like Meerkat and Periscope, represent even smaller fractions of internet 
users.126  Facebook’s market dominance makes it uniquely positioned to introduce 
widespread live-streaming to the public. 
1. Rights of the Streamers 
The first category of stakeholders in any live-streaming analysis is the streamer 
themselves.  As discussed above, an individual using Facebook Live has essentially 
assumed the position of a broadcaster—whether they know it or not.  Traditional 
broadcasters can expect to enjoy a number of rights:  The First Amendment protects 
their freedom of expression.127  Further, the 1934 FCC Act was passed with the 
intention of regulating the substance of broadcasts, but simultaneously, “Congress 
intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic 
freedom consistent with its public obligations.”128  Thus, broadcasters can expect 
that their content will not be overly censored or removed for, say, voicing an 
unpopular political opinion, and they can be relatively sure they will not be sued for 
discussing controversial topics on air, so long as they comply with the parameters of 
the law (such as the decency standards discussed above, and time, place, and manner 
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restrictions).129  However, under the FCC’s regulations, the rights of viewers trump 
the rights of broadcasters.130  So, what rights does Facebook reserve in its Privacy 
and Data policies for these individuals?  They can be found in Facebook’s 
Community Standards and Privacy Policy.131 
Facebook’s Community Standards are in place to ensure that Facebook remains 
as friendly to diverse viewpoints as possible.  This means that some content that some 
individuals may find disturbing may not be removed.  On the other hand, this also 
means that Facebook has reserved the right to disable the accounts of, or delete posts 
by, users who violate these norms.132  In other words, Facebook Live streamers are 
essentially subject to “decency” standards, similar to traditional media broadcasters.  
However, these standards are arguably far more lenient than the legal standards 
broadcast media must abide by, because the standards attempt to balance diverse and 
various viewpoints and sensibilities.133  Thus violence, nudity, and other graphic or 
insensitive content that is unlikely to appear on a TV broadcast because of decency 
standards can still appear on Facebook, though it is all subject to being reported by 
an offended user, and removed if deemed outside of Facebook’s Community 
Standards provisions.134  Consequently, regardless of the rights that may or may not 
be legally protected for streamers, to use Facebook Live, they must abide by these 
standards or risk having their streams removed or disabled. 
Facebook’s Privacy Policy, on the other hand, mostly operates to protect the 
personal data of Facebook users and explain how and why Facebook collects and 
shares some of this data.135  In fact, nothing in the policy addresses how Facebook 
might respond to or address a complaint against one user by another when they find 
themselves included in a video or live stream against their will.  The Privacy Policy 
is not a tool for protecting streamers from other users. 
In addition to the policies enforced by Facebook against the streamer, there is the 
question of what a streamer can do if Facebook curtails their ability to live stream in 
a manner that is inconsistent with these policies, or with the current legal landscape.  
While the protections provided by the First Amendment, as mentioned above, are 
vague in some areas, and private actors are not beholden to the First Amendment, the 
progression of technology does call for the First Amendment right to record to be 
examined again. 
Facebook undoubtedly dealt with First Amendment questions related to the 
posting of photographs and prerecorded videos.  While Facebook is not legally 
obligated to act or to create policies within the limits of the First Amendment, the 
Community Standards reflect Facebook’s attempt to balance the principle of freedom 
of speech with a level of decency and safety for Facebook users.  But live-streaming 
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raises a different and more complicated sort of question altogether.  The 
instantaneous nature of a live stream makes it difficult, if not impossible, to quickly 
notice when content is in violation of the Community Standards, absent a user report.  
While there is a team of Facebook employees who can interrupt streams, should they 
notice violations, it is unlikely that any and every offensive stream will be 
interrupted, especially if it is not widely viewed.136 
Additionally, the right to record is unclear, as multiple courts have limited or 
stretched it in different ways, whereas the doctrine of freedom of speech on the 
Internet is accepted.137  Drawing on this clear doctrine, Facebook can be sure that, 
regardless of any legal obligation (or lack thereof), its policy mandating the removal 
of user-posted photographs and videos, should they violate its content rules, are 
consistent with the principle of freedom of speech.138  Where to strike the correct 
balance between privacy and expression is less certain when a user is live-streaming, 
and privacy law, which could serve as a guide, is unclear as to how far a user’s rights 
extend.  Scott Kessler of S&P Global Market Intelligence summarized the problem: 
“They have to figure out how to strike a balance between decorum and freedom.  The 
onus is on these companies to make clear they actually have a process.”139 
Technically, Facebook Live streams and streamers are still subject to all of the 
same Community Standards as other Facebook users.  But in a statement Facebook 
released following the investigation of a video showing a mother slapping her 
daughter on Facebook Live, the company noted that: 
One of the most sensitive situations involves people sharing violent or graphic images 
of events taking place in the real world.  In those situations, context and degree are 
everything.  For instance, if a person witnessed a shooting, and used Facebook Live to 
raise awareness or find the shooter, we would allow it. However, if someone shared the 
same video to mock the victim or celebrate the shooting, we would remove the video.140 
In other words, it is not always clear to users what may or may not comply with 
Facebook’s standards (especially when there are teams of individuals screening 
content, who may introduce a level of discretion), and it is even less clear what 
privacy laws allow, and what they do not.141  While Facebook Live streamers have 
been compared to and function akin to broadcasters, there is currently no law or 
statute which explicitly treats them as broadcasters for legal purposes.  Thus, their 
avenues for enforcing their rights against Facebook are limited:  they do not benefit 
from FCC regulation in the way broadcasters can; case law on the subject of live-
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streaming is scant, whereas there are many cases involving traditional broadcasting; 
and while there are various statutes which pertain to censorship and expression that 
are enforceable against the state, these same statutes are not enforceable against 
private actors.142 
2. Rights of the Streamed 
One of the hardest questions to answer is whether the people captured in another’s 
live stream have any rights to enforce, and if so, whether they have any viable avenue 
through which to enforce those rights, either against the streamer themselves or the 
service provider.  One of the advantages of live-streaming, the elimination of the 
distinction or lag between the capturing and dissemination of video, is also one of 
the largest disadvantages for anyone who may wish to remain anonymous but finds 
themselves on camera.  In many cases, it is not feasible to use privacy laws to go 
after individuals who live stream, since the relevant footage is gone as soon as it is 
broadcast.  Further, the service providers themselves are largely immune from legal 
prosecution for many violations.143  In a situation like this, while ostensibly one 
could still seek legal recourse, the harm has already been done, and it would be hard 
to provide an adequate remedy. 
The usefulness of privacy law in the streaming context depends on two 
components:  the nature of the harm (and thus what is an adequate remedy), and 
whether the live stream is cached, stored, or uploaded anywhere.  If the law is aimed 
at violations for obtaining information regardless of its publication, this would 
require an altogether different remedy than a law aimed at penalizing the 
dissemination of private information.  Additionally, live streams that are 
subsequently stored or cached take on a different nature than streams which 
disappear as they are broadcast in real time—they can be treated like the more 
traditional videos one might see on YouTube, or posted to Facebook, and some of 
the answers to questions regarding how to deal with violations of the law stemming 
from such videos can be found in case law which has already been determined. 
The current discourse around potential rights for these individuals focuses on the 
right of privacy when one is in a public place—or the lack thereof:  in the current 
landscape, it is hard to conceive of a way in which those who are captured in a live 
stream in a public place, without their consent, can enforce their rights against those 
who captured them.144 
For example, the New York state law right of publicity allows plaintiffs to recover 
for their voice, name, or likeness being used for commercial purposes by another 
without their consent.145  For an individual captured in a live stream, however, this 
law probably does not provide much recourse, unless the live streamer happens to be 
a brand or company, because it requires commercial use.146  Large companies like 
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those Facebook paid to produce content for Facebook Live appear less likely to 
erroneously include individuals in a live stream without consent. 147   Yet, the 
possibility is still there.  In such a situation, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51, which 
protects the right to publicity, could actually provide a remedy.148 
The current privacy torts regime is not yet fully equipped to protect those 
unwittingly captured in live streams.  As Stewart and Littau explain, “[T]he door is 
open for Congress and state legislatures to consider laws that could punish the act of 
recording without knowledge or consent or provide civil remedies to citizens 
suffering privacy harms caused by the act of recording inherent in [live-
streaming].”149  The fact that there are currently laws which punish the taping or 
interception of an individual’s conversations without their knowledge or consent 
provides a precedent for such laws.150  The torts of intrusion upon seclusion and 
public disclosure of private facts provide the most likely avenues for enforcement, 
but there are substantial obstacles to creating a regime of liability for nonconsensual 
live-streaming under both tort schemes. 
Claims of intrusion of seclusion can be difficult to win, especially when the 
alleged intrusion takes place in a public place, as many live streams undoubtedly 
will.  A live-streamed individual will have a hard time showing that the intrusion was 
objectionable to a reasonable person under current law, because society has become 
so accustomed to the constant possibility of being caught on camera.151  Tort law has 
generally followed the principle that privacy cannot be invaded when a person is in 
public (with some exceptions).152  Therefore, without an expansion in the scope of 
intrusion upon seclusion and a realignment of what privacy expectations an 
individual has in public, this avenue of redress will largely be closed to streamers. 
Like intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts claims can also 
turn on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.153  Considering the amount 
of oversharing done online and the lack of use of privacy controls, it can be difficult 
to see how many disclosures could be truly offensive to the reasonable person.  Thus, 
a disclosure’s reasonableness insulates live streamers from liability while limiting 
recourse for those captured in the streams.154 
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The tort of appropriation has evolved into a remedy generally more applicable to 
celebrities, and is thus not useful to the average individual.155  However, the false 
light tort could provide a channel for some individuals who find that they are 
associated with a stream or streamer, or that they have been captured in another’s 
stream without consent, and have been harmed by the “false light” that this inclusion 
has cast upon them, particularly if that stream is widely viewed.  Ultimately, 
however, these three torts, and particularly intrusion upon seclusion and public 
disclosure of private facts, are unlikely to help an individual who has been streamed 
without consent in the typical case, without some changes to privacy law first: 
[None of the privacy torts] apply directly to most digital image capture.  Intrusion on 
seclusion provides relief only against images involuntarily captured within the target’s 
own home or in facilities remote from the public; publication of private facts is 
generally held to be inapplicable to images voluntarily exposed to the public gaze.156 
3. The ISP’s Protections 
The third category of stakeholders in the live-streaming analysis is the streaming 
service or ISP.  If the streamers themselves cannot be found liable for streaming 
someone against their will, can the streaming services?  Short answer:  Probably not.  
Attempting to hold a streaming service like Facebook liable for the privacy invasions 
of a user is unlikely to be successful, especially since private actors are not required 
to abide by many of the relevant laws that bind state actors.  Even though individuals 
captured in a live-stream presumably have not agreed to be featured in the stream, or 
to any conditions or terms, the live-streamers agreed to the Terms of Service and 
Policies of Facebook and similar services in order to use the services.157  This places 
an additional barrier to liability between the ISP and someone caught in the stream:  
the law has generally limited the duty of internet services to monitor legal violations 
entirely committed by their users.158 
Of course, there are exceptions to the idea that ISPs will not be held liable for 
legal violations committed by their subscribers.159  In addition, despite the lack of a 
legal duty, Facebook can and will remove content at its discretion based on its 
policies, which include barring infringing content and other content which violates 
the law or rights of others, including the law of privacy.160  In order to hold Facebook 
accountable for violations of individuals’ privacy, Facebook must be found to have 
some sort of legal duty to prevent such infringements by its users; so far, no such 
duty has been established by case law or statue. 
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V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
A. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The primary implication of the proliferation of live-streaming technology is that 
changes to our privacy laws are necessary.  Currently, no “right to obscurity” exists 
under U.S. law in the sense of the right of individuals to be “delisted” from the 
Internet, rather than the right to avoid being captured at all.161  “In the context of 
[live-streaming], obscurity is not about the act of being left alone in public.  Rather, 
it is about” reasonably being able to expect that one’s public life will not be open to 
immediate, worldwide online viewing and archiving without any potential 
remedy.162  The most significant obstacle to updating privacy law to cover live-
streaming is the principle that acts conducted in public are automatically open and 
available to public scrutiny, which has a lengthy history in law, but which legal 
commentators are finding less palatable as applied to the current and evolving 
technological and social landscape.163 
The notion that we become susceptible to scrutiny and surveillance once we step 
into the public sphere will be hard to shake, especially because technological 
advances have made it easier to surreptitiously observe and record others.  Yet, rather 
than assume that this means the public has accepted discarding of our privacy rights, 
legislators must understand that the opposite may just as easily be true:  the public 
may fear the encroachments upon their privacy represented by new technology and 
desire legal recourse that is not currently available.  Since the privacy regime is state-
based, this will require piecemeal examination and analysis of current state privacy 
laws, and an understanding both of the catalysts to past changes in privacy law and 
of how live-streaming compares to such previous catalysts. 
How can we make a law that is adaptable to the rapid changes and advances in 
technology?  Should we want to punish streamers?  These are important policy 
questions which will shape whether and how privacy law changes in response to live-
streaming.  If we wish to promote further live-streaming as a natural advancement of 
broadcast journalism and to avoid any curtailment of expression, any updates to 
privacy law may be weak or limited.  However, if legislators value privacy over 
expression, changes may be more forceful.  As it stands, finding a sustainable balance 
between privacy and expression is paramount.  Precedent such as updates to privacy 
law spurred by the advent of personal drones tells us that striking an appropriate 
balance between the right to record and freedom of expression on the one hand, and 
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the right to remain obscure and anonymous on the other, is difficult, and authorities 
prefer to shift the burden of delineating these rights rather than address these issues 
head on. 
B. PRIVACY TORTS 
Two of the four privacy torts are of particular interest as candidates for extension 
to cover live-streaming.  Stewart and Littau point out that various academics have 
already suggested potential expansions to some of the privacy torts:  “Thierer noted 
that the ‘tort of intrusion upon seclusion may evolve in response’ to increased 
surveillance . . .” Such adjustments, which would likely involve embracing the 
“limited privacy” approach Strahilevitz identified, are one avenue in which plaintiffs 
may have some recourse for violations of their expectation of privacy, even in public 
places.164 
The tort of public disclosure of private facts presents one possible avenue of 
redress.  The tort can be difficult to successfully enforce against traditional media 
sources, because it does not actually pertain to methods of newsgathering, but to the 
dissemination of this information.  Thus, as currently understood, it does not really 
reach the actual invasion of privacy itself, from a plaintiff’s point of view; rather, it 
punishes the defendant for publicizing the information gathered by this invasion.165  
While not worthless, such a remedy does not address the original harm itself.  
Plaintiffs are primarily concerned with the invasion of privacy when they bring 
claims under this tort.166  Additionally, proving that a particular piece of gathered 
information is not “newsworthy” has proved more difficult for plaintiffs than one 
might imagine, as displayed in cases like Shulman v. Grp. W. Productions, Inc.167 
In many instances, especially where the media has been involved, establishing 
liability for privacy torts has been difficult. 168   In the case of live-streaming, 
however, there are opportunities to do just that.  For example, while traditional media 
sources have adopted live-streaming as an additional method of disseminating news, 
ordinary individuals are the most numerous users of live-streaming services.169  
There are many instances of users acting as citizen journalists and capturing 
newsworthy or noteworthy events in their live streams, but there are significantly 
more instances of mundane, daily activities being live streamed to a person’s 
Facebook friends.170  It would be hard for the average streamer to make the case that 
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a video of oneself speaking into the camera about their day, during which an 
unsuspecting individual came into the frame, is “newsworthy” and deserves 
protection from tort liability.  However, the more followers the streamer has, the 
harder this argument may be to make, because there is a presumption that above a 
certain threshold of followers, an individual becomes a “public figure” and thus even 
their mundane activities are of interest to the public.171  At the same time, if the 
streamer does not have a significant following, the harm alleged can be harder to 
demonstrate. 
The traditional understanding of this tort was generally applicable to news media, 
who could make arguments that the subjects they captured and investigated 
represented “news.”172  Short lags in the time between video capture and broadcast 
could alleviate some of the issues by providing time for news organizations to “blur” 
faces, thereby protecting privacy, but in instances where this did not happen, First 
Amendment protection for newsgatherers has generally protected such intrusions, so 
long as they do not violate generally applicable laws.173 
Now that ordinary people are using live-streaming technologies to keep their 
friends and families in the loop, disseminate their opinions, and display their skills, 
the public disclosure of private facts tort can be an instrument for the ordinary user 
to protect their privacy.  In the past, however, plaintiffs have found it difficult to 
succeed this way.  In the case Sipple v. Chronicle Pub. Co., the plaintiff was publicly 
outed to his family and friends as a homosexual man as a result of his involvement 
in a foiled assassination attempt on President Ford.174  The court determined that 
because the fact of Sipple’s sexuality was a known fact in public circles, it was not a 
private fact and thus there was no liability for this intrusion.175  In contrast, in Doe v. 
Mills, the First District Court of Appeals of Michigan held that the defendant’s 
publication of the plaintiffs’ identities in connection with their abortions was held by 
the First District Court of Appeals of Michigan to be enough to state a question for 
the jury as to whether such information was sufficiently private to warrant recourse 
for its publication.176  Extrapolating from these cases the basic premise that a fact 
made public to some cannot be protected when revealed to others, one can derive the 
boundaries of liability for live-streaming in instances where ordinary individuals are 
concerned. 
The second privacy tort of note for present purposes is intrusion upon seclusion.  
Due to shifting notions of privacy, especially privacy in public, as discussed above, 
some lawmakers of this generation have found it hard to conceive of a regime in 
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which there is an expectation of privacy in public places that can be protected.  
Further, social media users have a tendency to over-share on the Internet. 177  
However, statistics on privacy and social media indicate that users still value their 
privacy and are using the provided methods of protecting it on social media sites.178  
With this in mind, extending the tort of intrusion upon seclusion to encompass live 
streamers could be a potential method of protecting the privacy of individuals. 
Since the alleged harm of exposure done by a live stream is nearly impossible to 
remedy before or even during the fact, any remedy would be based on the concepts 
of retribution and deterrence.  That said, many live streamers may be virtually 
judgment proof because they are ordinary individuals with low net worth. 
C. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF PROTECTION  
One potential extralegal avenue for addressing the privacy issues raised by live-
streaming is via the Privacy Policies and Terms and Conditions written and enforced 
by service providers.  Often, these terms can govern where the law cannot or does 
not reach.  While changes to legislation can be slow, with political roadblocks 
impeding the process, ISPs have the autonomy to insert any provisions into their 
policies and terms that they would like, within the contours of the law.179 
Inserting provisions which require streamers to obtain consent from any 
participants in their stream in the course of streaming events that are not considered 
“newsworthy,” while perhaps burdensome, would at the very least allow recourse to 
those individuals who take issue with finding themselves online.  Streamers could 
then be punished by suspending their accounts if they willfully fail to obtain this 
consent.  Potential remedies could include warnings to the streamers themselves sent 
from the service providers, and even temporary disabling of accounts or streams, 
should an individual file a complaint with the service provider. 180   Using this 
approach, the service provider becomes the entity in charge of enforcing the privacy 
of individuals, rather than the state.  While the punishments for violations would be 
less severe, balancing expediency and the value of live-streaming with privacy rights 
warrants at least some enforcement through this method. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The two most viable ways to bring privacy law and protections in line with current 
attitudes and concerns are expanding the privacy torts of intrusion upon seclusion 
and public disclosure of private facts to better provide remedies for privacy violations 
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caused by live-streaming, and non-legal methods of protection such as updating 
service provider privacy policies and terms of use and service.  The public debate 
surrounding privacy and the Internet is becoming increasingly polarized; there is a 
disconnect between how service providers act and address privacy concerns, and 
what users claim to want.181  Users of social networking sites, especially women and 
younger users, are increasingly taking steps to protect their privacy online, such as 
un-friending other users, removing content, and restricting access to their profiles.182  
These actions point to the conclusion that privacy online still matters to users.  
Legislators and service providers must implement strategies and changes to privacy 
law which will protect these interests while balancing the right of individuals to post 
content and exercise their freedom of expression. 
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